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[Crim. No. 7781. In Bank. July 14, 1964.] 
In re PAUL KERN IMBLER on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Habeas Corpus-Grounds for Belief-Bentence.-Where de-
fendant has been convicted of fIrst degree murder and sen-
tenced to death and such judgment and sentence have been 
aftlrmed on appeal, errors which occurred during defend-
ant's penalty trial but which were not deemed to be prejudicial 
by the Supreme Court until after defendant's appeal had been 
determined may properly be raised on habeas corpus. 
[2] Criminal Law-Punisbment-Procedure for Determining Pen-
alty.-On the penalty phase of a murder case, it was prejudi-
cial error for the prosecutor to state in his argument to the 
jury that life imprisonment does not mean life imprisonment 
and to attack the Adult Authority for its alleged inconsistency 
in releasing on parole prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment, 
and for the court to instruct that the jurors might consider in 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 39; Am.Jur., Habeas 
Corpus (1st ed § 55 et seq). 
:Melt. Dig. References: [1] HabeRs Corpus, § 34(1); [2] Crim-
inal Law. ~ 1011.1 . . 
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determining w:uether to sentence defendant to death or life 
imprisonment, "the possibility of parole after at least seven 
years' imprismnment of one sentenced to prison for life. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to review a·death penalty 
imposed on petitiuner after his conviction of murder. Writ 
granted as to perui.lty trial; judgment imposing death penalty 
reversed as to p.enalty and in all other respects affirmed; 
petitioner remaz:I:i'!!d to custody of Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County for a new penalty trial. 
Gregory S. Sc.put, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, and Jules C. Goldstone for Petitioner. 
Earl Klein as .Lmicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Albert W. Harris, Jr., 
Robert R. Granue:ei and John F. Kraetzer, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Respr.mdent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-.A jury convicted petitioner of first degree 
murder and fixed lhis penalty at death. We affirmed the judg-
ment (People v. Itw.Uer, 57 Cal.2d 711 [21 Cal.Rptr. 568, 371 
P.2d 304]) and wereafter denied a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus ehaJ..lenging the determination of petitioner's 
guilt. (In re Imi-ter, 60 Cal.2d 554 [35 Cal.Rptr. 293, 387 
P.2d 6].) PetitioU'J' now contends that his penalty should be 
redetermined beez.use the errors condemned in People Y. 
Morse, 60 Ca1.2d ~31 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33], oc-
curred during his penalty trial. [1] This issue is properly 
raised on habeas eorpus. (In re Jackson, ante, p. 500 [39 
Ca1.Rptr. 220, 3~ P.2d 420].) 
The only evide%:Lee introduced at the penalty trial was the 
testimony of a fMmer member of the California Adult Au-
thority about the qualifications of the members of the Adult 
Authority, parole procedures, the factors considered in de-
termining a prisr"ner'8 fitness for parole, and the possibility 
of parole for fim degree murderers. The prosecuting attor-
ney attempted to wcit from the witness testimony showing 
that the policies qf the Adult Authority were inconsistent 
and that tMre was considerable recidivism among paroled 
first degree murde-rers. 
[2] In his arg-'IlIDent the prosecutor prefaced his remarks 
about the possibility of parole by stating, "The alternative 
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you know by now, after listening to [the former member of; 
the Adult Authority] ••• , life imprisonment in California'~ 
certainly doesn't mean life imprisonment. It certainly'; 
doesn't mean life imprisonment." He went on to attack the' 
Adult Authority generally: " •.. as you saw, [the statistics 
purporting to show the median time served by life termers) 
... varied quite a bit, and that variation goes to show, if 
anything, that there is complete inconsistency in the Adult' 
Authority. " He attacked the ex-member witness in particular: 
., He didn't have any training at all ..•. ' I Because of the 
members' poor qualifications, he argued, the Authority can 
be fooled and "bingo, [the prisoner] ... is back out on the 
streets again, again threatening the lawful eommunity .••• 
So, this is what life imprisonment means." 
The trial court then instructed the jurors that they might 
consider the possibility of parole nfter at least seven years' 
imprisonment in deciding which penalty to choose. 
TllUs the errors condemned in Morse were committed in 
petitioner's trial, and were clearly prejudicial. (People v. 
Hilles, ante, pp. 164, 169-170 [37 Ca1.Rptr. 662, 390 P.2d 
398].) 
The writ is granted as to the penalty trial of petitioner. The 
remittitur issued in Crim. No. 6999, People v. Imbler, is re-
called, and the judgment imposing the death penalty is 
reycrsed insofar as it relates to the penalty. In all other re-
spects the judgment is affirmed. Petitioner is remanded to the 
custody of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County for a 
new penalty trial. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., eon-
curred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-I would deny the writ of 
habeas corpus and permit tIle trial court's judgment to stand i 
as rendered and heretofore affirmed. (See People v. Imbler 
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 711 [21 Ca1.Rptr. 568, 371 P.2d 304] ; In 
re Imbler (1963) 60 Ca1.2d 554, 558, 571 (35 Cal.Rptr. 293, 
887 P.2d 6] ["Proceeding in habeas corpus to secure release 
from cU8tody, or for a writ of error coram 'Vobis, or other 
appropriate relief"]; In re Jackson (1964) ante, pp. 500, 
508 [39 Cal.Rptr. 220, 393 P.2d 420] (dissenting opinion of 
McComb, J.).) 
McComb, J., concurred. 
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